Industrial delicensing which began in 1985 in India marked a discrete break from a past of centrally planned industrial development. Similar liberalization episodes are taking place across the globe. We develop a simple Schumpeterian growth model to understand how …rms respond to the entry threat imposed by liberalization. The model emphasises that …rm responses, even within the same industrial sector, are likely to be heterogeneous leading to an increase in within industry inequality. Technologically advanced …rms and those located in regions with pro-business institutions are more likely to respond to the threat of entry by investing in new technologies and production processes. Empirical analysis using a panel of 3-digit state-industry data from India for the period 1980-1997 con…rms that delicensing led to an increase in within industry inequality in industrial performance.
Introduction
Economic liberalization is happening across the globe. Within the same industrial sector, …rms which have di¤erent technological capabilities or which are located in regions with di¤erent types of institutions, may respond in a heterogeneous manner to the competitive pressure imposed by the removal of barriers to entry during liberalization episodes. In short, the e¤ects of liberalization may be unequal -some …rms may bene…t whilst others su¤er, leading to growing within industry inequality in industrial performance. This paper looks directly at this issue from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint. In doing so it departs from much of the recent literature which attempts to evaluate the average e¤ects of economic liberalization on industrial performance. 1 To guide our research we construct a simple version of a Schumpeterian growth model with entry threat. How …rms respond to this entry threat by investing in new technologies and production processes will be determined by two sets of factors, one internal to …rms and the other external. Technological capability of …rms determines their ability to compete with potential entrants. Firms close to the technological frontier will be incentivised to invest and innovate whilst those far from frontier will be disincentivised. The institutional environment in which …rms operate which is captured, for example, by the extent to which labor institutions are pro-employer in a given region, will also a¤ect the extent to which they respond to entry threats via investment and innovation. For these reasons, as entry barriers come down with liberalization we expect to observe growing divergence in economic performance across industries within the same industrial sector but located in di¤erent regions of a country.
It is this core prediction of entry liberalization leading to rising within industry inequality that we take to the data. To do this we exploit a 3-digit state-industry To capture entry liberalization we construct a delicensing measure which records when a given 3-digit industry was delicensed. We then relate this measure to inequality in economic performance across 3-digit state-industries within the same 3-digit industrial sector. This enables us to examine directly whether the reduction in barriers to entry led to a divergence in industrial performance across Indian states within the same 3-digit industrial sector as is predicted by the model. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some theory which enables us to examine how the removal of barriers to entry a¤ects industrial performance depending on the technological capacity of …rms and their institutional environment.
Section 3 presents empirical analysis of the link between entry liberalization and within industry inequality using an Indian 3-digit state-industry panel for the period 1980-1997. Section 4 concludes.
The Model 2
Consider the following version of the Schumpeterian discrete-time model of Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2004) . The model economy consists of a set of "states" (or regions) which di¤er in their factor endowments, distribution of productivities across …rms and labor market regulations.
All agents live for one period. In each period t a …nal good (henceforth the numeraire) is produced in each state by a competitive sector using a continuum one of intermediate inputs, according to the technology: A …rm consists of an entrepreneur, who has the power to take decisions concerning production and investments, workers that for simplicity we assume to be in a …xed number, and a technology to transform one unit of the …nal good into one unit of intermediate good of productivity A t ( ).
Standard analysis (see Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2004) shows that the surplus generated by this …rm is equal to (1 ) = : The equilibrium pro…t appropriated by the entrepreneur is, then:
Also, substituting for the equilibrium production level of each intermediate good,
x t ( ); in the production function for …nal output, we obtain the total output level
is the average productivity in the state.
Technological states, innovation, and entry
In every period, and within each state, intermediate …rms di¤er in terms of their current distance to the world "technological frontier". We denote the productivity of the frontier technology at the end of period t by A t and assume that this frontier grows at the exogenous rate g. More formally:
At the beginning of period t (or, identically, at the end of period t 1), the leading …rm in the production of a particular intermediate input can be in two states: (i) "high-productivity" …rms have a productivity level A t 1 ( ) = A t 1 ;
namely, are at the current frontier; (ii) "low-productivity" …rms have a productivity level A t 1 ( ) = A t 2 ; namely, are one step behind it.
Before deciding their production plans, …rms can undertake investments in technology adoption to increase their productivity. Innovative investments have a stochastic return. In case of success, the incumbent …rm can adopt the next most productive technology, i.e., can increase its productivity by a factor 1 + g and keep pace with the advancement of the technological frontier. The cost of technology adoption is assumed to be quadratic in the probability of success and linear in the level of technology:
where z is the probability of success of the investment. If instead the investment is not successful (probability 1 z), the …rm produces with a productivity level equal to its initial state.
We make the following assumptions about …rms'dynamics. If an advanced …rm is successful at t; it starts as an advanced …rm at t+1: All other …rms start as backward …rms (note that this implies that …rms with a realized productivity equal to A t 2 at t automatically upgrade their initial productivity due to some spillover e¤ect).
However, in this case, with an exogenous probability h; the leader is replaced by a new …rm starting as advanced at t + 1. Let a t denote the proportion of "advanced" …rms at t, and z A denote the innovative investment of advanced …rms. Then the productivity distribution is characterized by the following dynamics:
implying the steady-state proportion of advanced …rms being equal to a =
Intermediate …rms are subject to competition from outsiders. In particular, we assume that, in every period, an outsider can operate a hit-and-run entry in the local market for a particular intermediate good. 3 Outside …rms observe the outcome of the innovative investment of the local …rm, and face the following decision. They can either stay out of the market, or pay a small …xed cost, ; and be granted permission to sell in the local market with probability . 4 Outsiders are assumed have the frontier productivity, A t :
3 A variant of this model with permanent entry is developed by Aghion, Blundell, Gri¢ th, Howitt and Brantl (2004) who then confront it with UK …rm level data on entry threat, actual entry, patenting and productivity growth. 4 We can interpret as the probability of success of an application for a license or in overcoming other legal barriers to starting production.
If an outsider enters and competes with a low productivity …rm, it steals all the market. If it competes with a high-productivity …rm, however, Bertrand competition drives the pro…ts of both …rms to zero. We assume the parameters to be such that the outside …rm will always …nd it pro…table to try to enter if the market is controlled by a low-productivity …rm. However, the outsider will not try to enter if there is a high-productivity incumbent. Therefore, the probability of entry in the market for input will be zero, if the local …rm was initially "advanced"and has undertaken a successful innovative investment. Else, the probability is .
Equilibrium innovation investments
We now consider the decisions of incumbent producers in each of the technological states. Recall that all agents live for one period only, therefore incumbent producers born at date t maximize the expected pro…ts accruing at the end of the same period t: This is a useful simpli…cation that avoids the need to solve more complicated dynamic problems.
Backward …rms choose their investment so as to maximize expected pro…ts, as given by:
whose solution yields:
Recall that backward …rms can only make pro…ts if there is no entry (probability 1 ). The productivity is A t 1 if the investment is successful (probability z) and A t 2 if the investment is not successful (probability 1 z). 5
Advanced …rms choose their innovation investment in order to solve the following program:
In this case, incumbent …rms can prevent entry by successfully adopting the last technology, which occurs with probability z: In this case, the local …rm has a productivity level A t : The …rm also retains the market if the investment is not successful, but there is no entry. This event occurs with probability (1 ) (1 z). In this case the …rm's productivity is A t 1 .
We interpret an increase of the entry threat, , as a liberalization reform.
Straightforward di¤erentiation of equilibrium innovation intensities with respect to 5 One could generalize the model to allow for the possibility that through aggressive innovative investments backward …rms can catch-up with the frontier. This would create scope for defensive innovation from backward …rms when the probability of entry increases. As long as the probability that backward …rms can make large jumps is su¢ ciently low, this extension would not change qualitatively the comparative statics of the model. yields:
In other words, increasing the entry threat (e.g., through slashing barriers to entry via delicensing) encourages innovation in advanced …rms and discourages it in backward …rms. The intuition for these comparative statics is immediate. The higher the threat of entry, the more important innovations will be in helping incumbent …rms already close to the technological frontier to retain the local market. However, …rms that are already far behind the frontier have no chance to win over a potential entrant. Hence, a higher threat of entry will only lower the expected net gain from innovation, thereby reducing the incentive for the incumbent to invest in innovation.
Next, consider the e¤ects of changes in labor market regulations on innovative investments. "Pro-worker" regulations are captured by smaller 0 s, as discussed above. It is immediate that
Hence, pro-workers labor market regulations discourage innovation in all …rms, but they do so to a larger extent in advanced …rms.
Predictions for state-industries
We have so far assumed, for simplicity, that there is only one sector of activity. The stylized model presented above can be reinterpreted as describing a single industry rather than the economy as a whole. Each state-industry should then be viewed as an "island" populated by a set of competitive …nal producers and a set of non-competitive di¤erentiated intermediated producers. The products of di¤erent industries are perfect substitutes in consumption, and the price of all …nal goods is set equal to unity. Thus, the equilibrium described in this section, as well as its comparative statics, can be regarded as the equilibrium of a state-industry. The average productivity of …rms in state-industry is A i;s;t = R 1 0 A i;s;t ( )d :
Steady-state productivity di¤erences across state-industries are assumed to be driven by idiosyncratic state-industry e¤ects a¤ecting the exogenous probability of upgrading, h; and in the state-speci…c parameter (labor market regulation). More formally,
where h i;s = h + " i;s : This representation allows us to introduce in a parsimonious way steady-state productivity di¤erences across state-industries: more advanced state-industries (conditional on labor market regulations) are those with high h i;s 's.
The model's predictions for …rm behavior now hold at the level of state-industries (see Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti, 2004) .
The Unequal E¤ects of Liberalization 6
State control of Indian industry was enshrined in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951 whereby …rms required a licence in order to establish a new factory, to expand capacity by more than 25% of existing levels, or to manufacture a new product. These controls were supplemented with state controls on …nan-cial intermediation, imports, foreign direct investment and high tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers as part of an overall strategy of centrally planned industrial development.
Licensing enabled the state to control the pattern of industrial development across
Indian states and to address regional disparities. India lived under this "License Raj"for the bulk of its post-colonial history, however, slow growth in the late-1960s and 1970s (see Table 1 State panel data for the period 1960-1997 from Besley and Burgess (2004) suggests that economic liberalization was associated with rising economic growth, particularly in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1 ). 7 Figure 1 Using Indian Annual Survey of Industries data we can carry out a similar exercise looking at inequality across states within 3-digit registered manufacturing industries.
To do this we calculate the standard deviation across states of log gross output and output per employee within a 3-digit manufacturing industry for each year between 1980 and 1997. Figure 2 graphs the three-year moving average of the median of these within-industry standard deviations across this period. Consistent with the model we observe growing inequality following the 1985 delicensing reforms, with 7 See Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) and Topalova (2004) . 8 Manufacturing …rms with more than ten employees with power or with more than twenty without are classi…ed as registered whereas …rms below these cut-o¤s are classi…ed as unregistered. 9 The falling trend pre-1985 re ‡ects the use of licensing and other state controls to reduce regional disparities in industrial development. the within industry inequalizing e¤ects of liberalization becoming particularly strong post-1991. 10 To directly link within 3-digit industry inequality to industrial delicensing we run regressions of the form:
where i denotes a 3-digit registered manufacturing industry and t year, y it is an economic outcome of interest, delic it is a 0=1 dummy which switches on when a 3-digit industry is delicensed, d t is a year dummy that controls for common macroeconomic shocks and will capture the overall e¤ects of the 1985 and 1991 liberalizations across all 3-digit industries, i is an industry …xed e¤ect that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across 3-digit industries, and u it is a stochastic error. To allow for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error term over time, the standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry level. This is a "di¤erences in di¤erences" speci…cation, where the e¤ect of delicensing is identi…ed from the di¤erential change over time in the economic outcome in industries which delicense relative to industries where compulsory industrial licensing is retained.
The delic it measure corresponds to the probability of entry measure u in the model. We would therefore expect industrial delicensing to encourage entry. 11 Column (1) of Table 2 con…rms this where we see that delicensing increases the number of factories in a 3-digit industry. We are now in a position to link entry liberalization to inequality in industrial performance within 3-digit industries across states.
Columns (2) and (3) shows that delicensing leads to an increase in within industry inequality in output and output per employee. Columns (4) and (5) 1 2 The paper is contribution to the growing literature which emphasises that a …rms distance from the technoligical frontier will determine the extent to which it bene…ts from entry. Sabirianova, Svenjar and Terrell (2004) , for example, …nd that greater presence of foreign …rms in a given industry has a negative average e¤ect on the productive e¢ ciency of Czech and Russian domestic …rms but the e¤ect is positive on the e¢ ciency of other foreign owned …rms.
Conclusions
The world has tended to divide between those who are for or against liberalization. Reality it turns out is more nuanced -there can no a priori assumption that industry in a particular region of a country will bene…t from or be harmed by liberalization. Consistent with our theoretical model we …nd that entry deregulation elicited heterogeneous responses from industries in the same 3-digit sector but located in di¤erent states of India. This is an important …nding as it suggests that actions by …rms to upgrade technological capability or by policy makers to improve the institutional environment will have a central bearing on whether industry in a given sector and state bene…ts from or is harmed by the process of economic liberalization. Identi…cation of policies which enable local industry to bene…t from economic liberalization is where the research frontier now lies. The combination of economic theory and microeconomic data sources, together with an emphasis on incentives and technology, provides a fruitful avenue for further research on the microeconomics of industrial development.
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